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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH-IDAHO SCHOOL SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH: STATE BU IL DING 
BOARD and HERBERT F'. SlVIART, 
Director of :F'inance of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
A~1ERICAN DESK l\i!ANUF1-\C-
TURING COMPANY, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11395 
This is an action brought for declaratory judg-
ment interpreting, construing and declaring the validity 
of certain statute or statutes of the State of Utah, in 
which action appellant intervened on the side of the 
defendants. 
l 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Declaratory judgment was granted in the lower 
Court, which judgment concluded, in part, that the 
Utah State Building Board was not obliged to let the 
contract in question to the lowest bidder who in their 
judgment was responsible and qualified to do the work 
and which directed said board to enter into a contract 
with plaintiff, who was the high bidder. From this 
judgment, intervenor appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the decision of the lower 
Court reversed and plaintiff's action dismissed with 
prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State of Utah, by and through its Department 
of Finance, advertised for sealed, written bids for per-
manent seating to be furnished and installed in the 
"Special Events Arena" at the University of Utah, 
payment for which was to be made from trust funds 
collected as part of student fees and held in trust by 
a depository of the State. 
Advertisement for bids was pursuant to detailed 
plans and specifications prepared by professional archi-
tects commissioned by the State and approved by both 
the University of Utah and the State prior to their 
being published. These detailed plans and specifications 
expressly called for bids on three different types of 
seating manufactured by American Seating Company, 
of which plaintiff is the local sales representative, and 
for one type of seating manufactured by intervenor. 
The four types of seating were identified by the two 
manufacturers' model numbers and by detailed charac-
teristics supplied by the two manufacturers relating 
to the various types of seating. In each instance, the 
detailed specifications required that the seating have 
a self-rising feature which would cause the seats to rise 
to an upright position automatically when unoccupied. 
Intervenor submitted a bid in strict conformity 
to the plans and specifications in the sum of $296,049.18 
or a unit price of $19.94 per seat. Plaintiff submitted 
a bid for what was designated in the detailed speci-
fications as "Seat Type I'' of $347,568.00 or a unit 
price of $23.41; for "Seat Type 2" of $391,366.00 or 
a unit price of $26.36; and for "Seat Type 3" of $335,-
542.00 or a unit price of $22.60. In addition, plaintiff 
proposed deductive alternates on "Seat Type 3" of 
$7,571.00 or $0.51 per unit for leaving off the plastic 
arm rests and of $25,982.00 or $1.75 per unit for omit-
ting the required self-riser. 
The Board of the University Regents, after 
some dickering with plaintiff, recommended to the 
building board acceptance of plaintiff's bid for "Seat 
Type 4" with the self-riser omitted or a total of $309,-
559.95 and preservation of an "option" given by plain-
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tiff after opening of the bids to later add an improved 
self-riser which plaintiff was attempting to develop. 
This recommendation later was amended to include 
elimination of plastic armrests, bringing the total bid 
of plaintiff which the Regents recommended accepting 
to $301,987.98. 
Both plaintiff and intervenor accompanied their 
bids with bonds and met all of the other statutory re-
quirements to have their bids considered. However, 
neither intervenor nor any other bidder was permitted 
to submit a competing bid or "option" which included 
elimination of either the self-riser or the plastic arm 
rests. 
The building board approved the recommendatiO'ii 
of the Regents. However, on advice of the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah the Board declined to let 
the contract to plaintiff and prepared and submitted 
to intervenor contracts for furnishing and installing the 
seating. Intervenor signed the contracts and returned 
them to the State of Utah, accompanied by the neces-
sary bonds. 
These documents were in the hands of represen-
tatives of the State of Utah and the contracts were 
on the desk of the director of the State building board 
awaiting his signature when he was prohibited from 
signing them by a writ issued by this Honorable Court 
in a separate proceeding. His signature, at that time, 
was all that was needed to provide a legally-binding 
contract between intervenor and the State of Utah. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE COURT ERRED IN CON-
STRUING STATUTES OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH RELATING TO CONTRACTS LET BY 
THE BUILDING BOARD FOR FACILITIES 
FINANCED BY STUDENT FUNDS. 
We are principally concerned with two statutes 
of the State of Utah, the first of which merits setting 
forth totally and the second of which merits excerpting. 
53-38-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
provides: 
"Deposits of bond proceeds-Powers of Utah 
state building board-Powers of state depart-
ment of finance. - That the proceeds derived 
from the sale of any bonds authorized under the 
provisions hereof shall be deposited by the treas-
urer of the board in a bank or trust company 
approved as a regular depository by the state 
depository board to the credit of the board and 
kept in a separate fund and used solely for the 
purpose for which the bonds are authorized as 
provided by resolution of the board. The Utah 
state building board is authorized to make all 
contracts and execute all instruments which in 
its discretion may be deemed necessary or ad-
visable to provide for the acquisition, purchase, 
construction, improvement, remodeling, addition 
to, extension, furnishing, and equipment of the 
building and the acquisition of all necessary land 
therefor, and the state department of finance is 
directed and authorized to issue warrants upon 
the state treasurer against such funds for such 
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amounts as he may from time to time find to be 
due upon audited itemized estimates and claims 
presented by the Utah state building board as 
provided under the provisions of the resolution 
of the board of regents, state board of education 
or board of trustees authorizing the issuance of 
the bonds and which bear the approval of the 
official or officials designated for _such purpose 
by resolution of the board authorizing such 
bonds." 
63-10-7 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
provides in material part: 
"Power and duties.-The Utah state building 
board shall carry out the building and expansion 
program of the state as provided by law, as and 
when funds are from time to time available. The 
board is given power and authority to do any 
and aU things which in its judgment may be 
necessary or proper for carrying out the provi-
sions of this chapter including, but not limited 
to, the following express powers and duties: ... 
. . . " ( 5) To cause to be prepared and sub-
mitted, either by its own employees or others, 
designs, plans and specifications for the various 
buildings and improvements, or other work to 
be carried out by the board; ... provided, that 
no building shall be constructed, improvements 
made or work done for, or on the property of, 
any state institution until the locations, design, 
plans and specifications therefor shall be ap-
proved by the board, commission or officials 
charged with the administration of the affairs of 
such institution. . . . 
. . . " ( 7) To make contracts for any work 
which the board is autho:i;ized by law to do or 
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cause to be done; . . . and, provided that any 
contract except those for professional services 
to be let to the lowest bidder who in the judg-
ment of the board is responsible and qualified to 
do the work. The judgment of the board as to 
the responsibility and qualifications of such bid-
ders shall be conclusive, except in case of fraud 
or bad faith. . . . " 
A brief, albeit thorough, consolidation of these two 
statutes should resolve the question as to whether the 
lower Court erred and should resolve that question in 
favor of the appellant. 
Chapter 38 of Title 53 deals, generally, with campus 
buildings financed from the issuance of bonds as was 
the instant structure (Exhibit P2). Section 3, set forth 
hereinabove, after disposing of the manner in which 
the proceeds should be preserved, states: " . . . The 
Utah state building board is authorized to make ~11 
contracts and execute all instruments which in its dis-
cretion may be deemed necessary or advisable to provide 
for the acquisition, purchase, construction, improvement, 
remodeling, addition to, extension, furnishing and equip-
ment of the building . . . ". 
That the building board deemed it "necessary or 
advisable" to make the instant contract cannot be left 
in doubt. The board published and circulated the de-
tailed plans and specifications (Exhibit Pl) which 
included a sample contract; it invited bids from both 
plaintiff and intervenor; and, it subsequently prepared 
and submitted for the signature of intervenor contracts 
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identical to the sample contract which was made a part 
of the detailed plans and specifications. 
The authority of the board to make such contracts 
is made exclusive by 53-38-5 UCA 1953, as amended. 
Such authority is not granted concurrent to any such 
authority vested in or reserved to the Board of Regents 
or any other public body. 
This exclusive authority having been unequivocally 
established, reference must be made to the provisions 
of 63-10-7 UCA 1953, as amended, to inquire as to 
the manner in which such contract must be let. 
Subsection ( 5) authorizes the board to "cause to 
be prepared ... design_s, plans and specifications for 
the various buildings and improvements . . . ". This 
it did (Exhibit Pl) . This same subsection reserves to 
the Board of Regents, in the instant case, the approval 
of " ... the locations, design, plans and specifications 
therefor ... ". This approval was made of the plans 
and specifications PRIOR TO THE ADVERTIS-
ING FOR BIDS. 
The Board of Regents having given its approval, 
its authority had expired prior to the opening of the 
bids. Anything which it may have done thereafter by 
purported recommendation, etc., was without statutory 
authority and has no bearing on the subsequent actions 
of the other boards of state government. 
Subsection (7) of 63-10-7 UCA 1953, as amended, 
then is controlling of our consideration. 
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It expressly authorizes the building board to " . . . 
make contracts for any work which the board is author-
ized by law to do or cause to be done; ... " 
Appellant submits that this includes that work 
authorized by 53-38-5 UCA 1953, as amended. 
However, that subsection goes on to recite a per-
tinent restriction on that authority when it continues 
" ... and, provided that any contract except those for 
professional services to be let to the lowest bidder who 
in the judgment of the board i~ responsible and qualified 
to do the work. ... " 
The lower Court found (Finding of Fact No. 15) 
from testimony of plaintiff's own witnesses that de-
fendants (including the State building board), had de-
termined prior to inviting bids that both plaintiff and 
intervenor were responsible and qualified to furnish 
' 
and install the prescribed seating. 63-10-7 (7) UCA 
1953, as amended, makes that judgment of the building 
board "conclusive". 
The building board having exercised its judgment 
that intervenor was "responsible and qualified" had 
only one other criterion upon which to determine the 
bidder to whom the contract must be let. That criterion 
lies in the word "lowest" contained in 63-10-7 (7) UCA 
1953, as amended. 
Intervenor being the lowest bidder of those pre-
determined to be "responsible and qualified" should 
have been let the contract. To do otherwise is outside 
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any authority granted the building board by any of the 
pertinent statutes. For the lower Court to permit the 
building board the authority to dicker with the highest 
bidder on terms which were not available to other 
bidders or prospective bidders and then let the contract 
to said highest bidder constitutes a complete emascu-
lation of the competitive bidding aspects of our statutes. 
What the lower Court's decision effectively does 
is to rewrite that subsection to permit the building board 
to prepare detailed plans and specifications, invite 
written and sealed bids thereupon and then dicker and 
finagle with the bidders and, eventually, award the 
contract to whomsoever it sees fit, notwithstanding 
competitive price and notwithstanding the successful 
bidder's failing to meet the requirements of the detailed 
plans and specifications. 
Intervenor submits that, whatever the reason for 
the lower Court's action, it canont be permitted to judi-
cially amend the legislative enactments so as to remove 
competitive bidding from building board projects. 
Intervenor feels impelled to point out that plain-
tiff did not bid its "air-conditioned Cadillac" against 
intervenor's "air-conditioned Continental." It bids its 
"air-conditioned Cadillac" ("Seat Type 3") against 
intervenor's "air-conditioned Continental" and then 
told the Board of Regents and building board "'V e'll 
cut our bid if you'll eliminate the air-conditioning (self-
riser) and leave off the wheels (plastic armrests)." 
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Even then, intervenor's air-conditioned Continental was 
the low bid! 
POINT 2: THE COURT ERRED IN RUL-
ING THAT PLAINTIFF HAD A LEGALLY 
PROTECTABLE INTEREST AND STAND-
ING IN COURT TO PREVENT EXECUTION 
OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE 
BUILDING BOARD AND INTERVENOR. 
Plaintiff filed it~ suit when the building board was 
about to execute a contract with intervenor and success-
fully delayed execution of such a contract. Plaintiff 
was an unsuccessful bidder; further, plaintiff was the 
high bidder. 
This Court previously has announced that some-
one seeking judicial recourse must have a legally-pro-
tectable interest (Lyon Y. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 
P .2d 818) . That plaintiff did not have such a legally-
protectable interest is well established by the general 
law, the U. S. Supreme Court and, of extreme impor-
tance, by this Court. 
Interestingly enough, the prior cases involve at-
tempts by the lowest bidder to compel letting of a con-
tract to it rather than to a higher bidder. The Courts 
have universally said that the lowest bidder has no in-
terest which the Courts will protect; how, then, can the 
lower Court now say that the highest bidder has such 
an interest? 
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Speaking of a writ of mandamus, 34 AmJ ur 936 
(Mandamus, Section 160) says in part: " ... The 
writ will not ordinarily issue to compel a municipal 
corporation or other public body, or their officers, to 
enter into a contract with the lowest bidder, ... " This 
same principle of law is emphasized in 43 AmJ ur 806 
(Public Works and Contracts, Section 64.) 
The reason for this general rule is, of course, basic 
to our form of government: the judiciary will not inter-
fere with the administrative actions of the executive 
without a showing of other factors which make those 
actions grounds for judicial relief. 
This principle has been adopted by this Court in 
Schulte vs. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 292, 10 P.2d 625 
(1932), and reiterated in Clayton v. Salt Lake City, 
15 Utah 2d 57, 387 P.2d 93 (1963). 
In the Schulte case, this Court said: "Courts will 
not interfere with the decision of the city authorities 
in awarding a contract if such decision is founded upon 
such facts that it is not a manifest abuse of discretion, 
is exercised in good faith, is in the interest of the public 
and is without collusion or fraud, and is not influenced 
by motives of personal favoritism or ill will." In the 
Clayton case, this Court rephrased the principle when 
it said: "The Court is reluctant to interfere with the 
administrative function and would do so only if facts 
were shown to indicate dishonesty, fraud, collusion or 
lack of good faith in performing the duty mentioned." 
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Two factors present in the Schulte and Clayton 
cases which are not present in the instant case should 
be emphasized. Both the Schulte and Clayton cases 
involved the LOWEST bidder seeking judicial assist-
ance in preventing the contracts from being awarded 
to a higher bidder; and, both of the cited cases involved 
statutes which did not require competitive nor even 
refer to letting the contract to the lowest bidder. In the 
Schulte case, this was Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, Sec. 
819, as amended by Laws of Utah 1919, Ch. 14. In the 
Clayton case, the statute was 10-7-20 Utah Code An-
notated 1953, which still is the law in this State. 
In both of those instances, this Court said the lowest 
bidder could not judicially challenge the letting or 
proposed letting of a public contract to a higher bid-
der. Is it not, then, a fortiori, that the highest bidder 
cannot judicially challenge the letting or proposed 
letting of a public contract to the lowest bidder? 
Intervenor submits that if the law is otherwise 
then the law is in a desperate position in this area. 
Intervenor was about to receive the contract in 
question. Without plaintiff's seeking judicial assistance, 
intervenor would have received that contract. The 
crux of plaintiff's lawsuit was the fact that it did not 
choose to agree with legal advice given to the building 
board by its constitutional legal adviser, the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah. 
The building board did not have to follow that 
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legal advice but elected to do so and to award the con-
tract to the lowest bidder. Intervenor submits to this 
1-Ionorable Court that the effect of plaintiff's lawsuit 
was to challenge the decision of the building board to 
follow its own attorney's advice and further submits 
that such a challenge is not justiciable in the Courts, 
provides plaintiff with no legally-protectable interest 
and provides plaintiff with no standing in Court. 
Had the building board elected not to follow the 
advice of the Attorney General and had executed a 
contract with plaintiff, under the Schulte and Clayton 
cases, intervenor would have had no such legally-pro-
tectable interest or standing in Court. However, just 
because it elected to follow that legal advice of the con-
stitutionally-designated officer, plaintiff has no stand-
ing in Court than intervenor would have had if the 
action of the building board had been reverse. 
Intervenor submits that the decision of the lower 
Court should be reversed and plaintiff's action dismissed 
with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLLIE McCULLOCH 
Attorney for Appellant 
510 American Oil Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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